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Calling a Truce in the Culture Wars: From
Enron to the CIA
Craig S. Lerner
Abstract
This Article compares and evaluates recent Congressional efforts to improve in-
stitutional “cultures” in the private and public sectors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 was designed to upgrade corporate culture by patching up the “walls” that
separate corporate management from boards of directors, accountants, lawyers,
and financial analysts. The Intelligence Reform Act of 2005 took a different tack,
hammering away at walls that supposedly segmented the intelligence community.
The logic was that the market failed because people did not observe sufficient
formalities in their dealings with one another, while the intelligence community
failed precisely because people kept their distance from one another and declined
to share information. The way to improve their respective cultures, Congress de-
termined, was to build up walls in the one case and to tear them down in the other.
This Article expresses some skepticism, however, about these solutions. Building
walls in the private sector increases transaction costs, which may outweigh any
benefits in detecting fraud. With respect to the intelligence community, compart-
mentalization of information diminishes risks associated with double agents; re-
dundancy of tasks may provide a safety margin; and segmentation of government
agencies may guard against civil liberties violations as well as provide additional
spurs to action. Furthermore, thriving firms in the private sector forge successful,
though likely idiosyncratic, cultures designed to exploit business opportunities.
Because the market is largely self-correcting, regulatory efforts to dictate a partic-
ular reorganization or cultural shift are probably unnecessary and possibly harm-
ful. By contrast, the CIA, FBI, NSA, and all other government agencies operate
without fear of bankruptcy, which is to say in the absence of penalties for deficient
cultures (or rewards for successful ones). Nonetheless, efforts to re-structure gov-
ernment bureaucracies, nominally to re-make their cultures, should be regarded
with caution. First, such efforts will almost inevitably be undertaken by political
actors, whose motivations are at a minimum suspect. Second, even assuming the
best of intentions and the utmost of human wisdom, central planners cannot fore-
cast the untold costs and benefits to a major governmental reorganization. The
Intelligence Reform Act’s overhaul of the intelligence community will have cer-
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I.  Introduction 
Less than three months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Enron 
Corporation fizzled into bankruptcy.  Members of Congress, who can find provocations to 
legislate wherever they gaze, predictably responded to these events by enlarging the United 
State Code by hundreds of pages.  To put the matter in common vernacular, 9/11 was an 
“intelligence failure” and Enron was a “market failure”; and here in America, whatever may 
be the case in lethargic Old Europe, if there’s a failure, there’s a solution. 
With respect to 9/11, the diagnosis ran something like this: American law enforcement 
and intelligence officials possessed all the information need to stop the attacks before they 
occurred.  The problem was not one of data collection, but analysis; in the well-worn 
metaphor of the day, we failed to “connect the dots.”1  Switching metaphors, the solution was 
to tear down “the walls” that had compartmentalized information.2  The USA Patriot Act,3 
                                                 
1 In K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots To Make Sense of Data, 5 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2005), the author notes that Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence 
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 House Permanent 
Select Comm. on Intelligence & Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, H. Rep. No. 107-792, S. Rep. 
No. 107- 351 (2002) [Joint Inquiry Report] refers at least ten times to the intelligence communities’ 
failure to "connect the dots.”
2  See, e.g., Richard Henry Seamon and William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall Between 
Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL. 319 (2005); Eleanor Hill, Staff 
Director, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement for Hearing on the Intelligence Community's Response to Past 
Terrorist Attacks Against the United States from February 1993 to September 2001 14 (Oct. 8, 2002) 
[hereinafter Joint Inquiry Staff Statement], available at http:// 
intelligence.senate.gov/0210hrg/021008/hill.pdf. ("The walls that had developed to separate 
intelligence and law enforcement often hindered efforts to investigate terrorist operations 
aggressively.").  I must plead guilty to using both the connecting the dots and wall metaphor.  See 
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enacted just weeks after the 9/11 attacks, chiseled away at the walls in various places.  Grand 
jury information, once hoarded by federal prosecutors, could now be shared with intelligence 
officers.4  Information obtained by intelligence officers could now be provided to law 
enforcement officers.5  Hortatory provisions in the Patriot Act huffed and puffed at the 
persisting wall fragments,6 and a few years later, with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act),7 Congress sledgehammered those 
remnants into rubble.  The centerpiece of the Intelligence Review Act was a new post, a 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), whose "principal authority to ensure maximum 
availability of and access to intelligence information within the intelligence community 
consistent with national security."8  In creating a DNI, Congress deferred to the National 
Commission to Study the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), 
which envisaged the DNI as a “powerful CEO” of a “very large private firm.”  His goal was 
to “unify[] the intelligence community,” which included branches within the FBI, the CIA, 
the NSA, the State Department, the Defense Department, the FAA, and the Department of 
Homeland Security.  Yes, now the walls really were tumbling down.     
Fortunately, Congress had other uses for all the metaphorical bricks and mortar.  
When Congress turned its attention to the collapse of Enron, a common diagnosis went like 
                                                                                                                                                        
Craig S. Lerner, The USA Patriot Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence Gathering 
and Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 493 (2003). 
3 Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
4 Id. § 218. 
5 Id. § 203. 
6 Id. § 504 (urging enhanced coordination between intelligence and law enforcement personnel). 
7 Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 
3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 46 
U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
8 Id. § 1011.  “[T]he Director of National Intelligence shall develop the Intelligence Community 
component of the strategy, [which] should encompass specific efforts to: ... to develop [the] capability 
to facilitate the timely and complete sharing of relevant intelligence information both within the 
Intelligence Community and with other appropriate federal, state, and local authorities.”  “Joint 
Inquiry Report at 4
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this:  Federal and state authorities had “deregulated” various aspects of the energy market, 
allowing companies like Enron to flourish.  Throughout the 1990s, Congress, the courts, and 
regulators “deregulated” still more, the implicit premise being that the market could more 
efficiently discipline bad actors than either lazy bureaucrats or rapacious plaintiffs’ lawyers.9  
Alas, left to its own devices, the market failed to monitor Enron (and several other 
companies);10 to state the matter more precisely, personnel within the company and closely 
connected to it inadequately fulfilled their roles as checks on corporate management.11  
Directors of the board, accountants, lawyers and financial analysts, all of whom should have 
preserved an independence from top executives, were increasingly aligned with those 
executives.  Walls (yes, the wall metaphor again!) that were designed to channel tasks and 
duties had crumbled; and Congress, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200212 sought to restore the 
walls the market had pummeled—walls between accountants and clients, between 
independent directors and corporate executives, and between investment banks’ retail banking 
divisions and their underwriting arms. 
Members of Congress justified all this wall construction and destruction by the need to 
re-make “cultures” of incompetence and even deceit.  With respect to Enron, its culture was 
studied and pronounced diseased. According to Senator Cantwell, "Enron’s corporate culture 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate of Denver, N.A. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) 
(eliminating private “aiding and abetting” liability in securities fraud cases); Private Securities Reform 
Act of 1995 (raising pleading standards for securities fraud); John C. Coffee, Understanding Enron: 
“It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. L. REV. 1403, 1410 (2002) (“There is reason to believe 
that, from some point in the 1980s until the late 1990s, the SEC shifted its enforcement focus away 
from actions against Big Five accounting firms.”).  
10 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1235 (2002) (suggesting that 
Enron stock's behavior in the markets provided "another set of reasons to question the strength of the 
efficient market hypothesis" and arguing for skepticism about the market as a policy option); FRANK 
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE 
VALUE OF NOTHING 30 (2004).   
11 See generally Coffee, supra note 9. 
12 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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fostered a disregard for the American energy customer.”13  Senator Leahy agreed: “The 
collapse of Enron has become a symbol of a corporate culture where greed has been inflated 
and accountability devalued.”14  Senator Baucus, musing on Arthur Andersen’s complicity in 
Enron’s crimes, noted that “professional firms need to cultivate professional cultures.”15  How 
true!  Members of Congress also cast a critical eye on the culture of intelligence community, 
which was also judged deficient. As Senator Olympia Stowe, a sponsor of the Intelligence 
Reform Act, announced in a press release, “We need to continue to move forward with 
broader reform in Congress so we can change an intelligence community culture that is 
drastic need of reform.”16  Pounding the same drum, Senator Specter criticized the “cultures 
of concealment” present in the intelligence community,17 Senator Chambliss spoke of the 
need for building a “risk-taking culture” in the intelligence community,18 and Senator Kyl 
announced that Congress, through the Intelligence Reform Act “will cultivate a culture within 
the intelligence community that makes it less likely that people will be willing to do the jobs 
we are asking them to do, and more likely that they will want to ‘play it safe.’"19
“Culture” might once have referred to a nation’s or a people’s music, philosophy, art, 
etc.—that is, the high stuff that lifts us out of our dismal bourgeois existence.  That plainly 
was not the Senators’ meaning when they heaped scorn on Enron and the intelligence 
                                                 
13 150 Cong. Rec. 109-101.  Senator Cantwell was quoting from a FERC document.  The line was also 
quoted by Senator Feinstein, 149 Cong.Rec. S13957-02, 
14 Or as Senator Byron Dorgan commented on CNN, Enron “is almost a culture of corporate 
corruption.  http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/02/03/enron.lay/. 
15 149 Cong.Rec. S15813-01>
16 http://snowe.senate.gov/pressap/record.cfm?id=225729.  The other Senator from Maine also saw fit 
to invoke “culture” in discussions of intelligence reform. In a Congressional hearing, Senator Collins 
asked a witness, “Could you please give us your thoughts as to how the DNI should use the 
legislation's personnel authority in order to create a culture of jointness [sic?] across the intelligence 
community.”  2005 WLNR 6238454.
17 150 Cong.Rec. S11939-01
18 150 Cong.Rec. S11939-01
19 150 Cong.Rec. S9997-02
 4
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art39
community.  But trying to figure out what they did mean is extraordinarily difficult.  For that 
matter, the word “culture” does not seem to have any precise meaning when wielded by 
know-it-alls in the academy.20  As far as I can tell, “culture” means any set of inner norms or 
beliefs that motivates a people to act in a certain way.  To be more marginally more precise, 
culture seems to refer to a particular community’s background moral rules.  If one were 
inclined to be pompous, one might liken “culture” to what Nietzsche called the “language of 
good and evil” in which a particular people converse.21  Of course, no one would say that the 
CIA or FBI were deceitful prior to 9/11, merely that they were incompetent for failing to pool 
information with one another.  But perhaps we should fault them just as we badger our 
children to share their favorite trucks and shovels in the playground, justifying this badgering 
to ourselves and them by the imperative of making them “better” people.    
Suffice it to say that “culture” talk is all the rage these days; and Congress has 
embarked upon massive reorganizations, both in the private sector through the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and in the public sector through the Patriot Act and Intelligence Reform Act, with 
the nominal goal of changing “cultures” that had somehow failed.  Yet at a tactical level, 
these culture wars are apparently being waged in quite different fashions.  In the case of the 
private sector, Congress diagnosed a culture of too much coziness, and hence the need for 
walls; in the case of the intelligence community, Congress perceived a culture of too little 
trust, and hence the need to hack away.   
In this Article, I compare and evaluate the Congressional diagnoses and solutions with 
respect to improving cultures in the private and public sectors.  Given the fact that the 9/11 
Commission itself has modeled its piece de resistance—the Director of National 
                                                 
20 A Westlaw search in the TP-ALL database on July 8, 2005 of ‘culture /10 norm!” generated 2589 
hits. 
21 The suggestion occurs in FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 35 (1995). 
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Intelligence—on a CEO, it would seem to have invited the comparison between public and 
private sectors.  I begin in Part II with an analysis of how Sarbanes-Oxley was designed to 
improve American corporate culture—by building walls among various groups and sub-
groups, thereby diminishing trust and coordination.  This section is useful in drawing attention 
to the potential utility of walls in shaping culture in the private sector.  In Part III, I argue that, 
at least at first glance, the approaches taken in Sarbanes-Oxley and the Intelligence Reform 
Act make sense:  The market failed because people did not observe sufficient formalities in 
their dealings with one another; by contrast, the intelligence community failed precisely 
because people kept their distance from one another.  The way to improve their respective 
cultures is to build up walls in the one case and to tear them down in the other. 
At second glance, however, the story become more complicated, and the 
Congressional solutions more problematic.  As I explore in Part IV, building walls in the 
private sector increases transaction costs, which may outweigh any benefits in detecting fraud.  
And with respect to the intelligence community, are walls necessarily a bad thing?  
Compartmentalization of information diminishes risks associated with double agents; 
redundancy of tasks may increase safety; and segmentation of government agencies may 
guard against civil liberties violations as well as provide additional spurs to action.   
Ultimately, in Part V, I conclude that the attempt to analogize between private and 
public sector reorganizations is faulty ab initio.  Enron, broadly cast to include its accountants 
at Arthur Andersen, its lawyers at Vinson & Elkins and its various analysts on Wall Street, 
was badly organized (and did have a corrupt culture, whatever that might mean), and to state 
the obvious:  Enron does not exist any more.  Thriving firms in the private sector forge 
successful, though likely idiosyncratic, cultures designed to exploit business opportunities.  
 6
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Because the market is self-correcting, regulatory efforts to dictate a particular reorganization 
or cultural shift are probably unnecessary and possibly harmful. 
By contrast, the CIA, FBI, NSA, and all other government agencies operate without 
fear of bankruptcy, which is to say in the absence of penalties for deficient cultures (or 
rewards for successful ones).  Nonetheless, efforts to re-structure government bureaucracies, 
nominally to re-make their cultures, should be regarded with caution.  First, such efforts will 
almost inevitably be undertaken by political actors, whose motivations are at a minimum 
suspect.  Second, even assuming the best of intentions and the utmost of human wisdom, 
central planners cannot forecast the untold costs and benefits to a major governmental 
reorganization.  As I argue below, the Patriot Act’s discrete changes to the laws governing 
information sharing among intelligence officers and law enforcement agents were defensible, 
for they were narrowly tailored to address grave flaws in the pre-9/11 law.  By contrast, the 
Intelligence Reform Act’s overhaul of the intelligence community will have certain and 
substantial costs in the short-term, and very uncertain, if any, benefits in the long term.  
Contrary to the story told by the 9/11 Commission, the intelligence community performed 
quite well before 9/11, and to the extent that individuals within it did not perform even better 
it was because of legal barriers (real or imagined) already removed by the Patriot Act.    
II.  The Enron “Culture” and Two Cheers for Walls   
 After Enron’s collapse, many people took to studying its “culture” and, needless to 
say, it was pronounced mortally sick.  Within the company, an extreme competitiveness was 
fostered by a “rank and yank” policy that annually meant the dismissal of the bottom 10% of 
employees in every division.  This policy led to a high level of amorality and cronyism.  
Another diagnosis of Enron, from a different angle, emphasized that there was all too much 
 7
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
coziness at and around Enron.  People whose interests should not have been perfectly aligned 
acted in perfect harmony.  It is useful to pause and reflect on a harmonious culture as a 
problem and not as the stuff of a Kumbaya pow-wow.  A culture of trust may be useful in 
accomplishing an organization’s objections, but whether that is good or bad depends on the 
value of those objectives.  One would prefer, for example, that an organized crime family not 
be so harmonious; and indeed what prevents Tony Soprano from more enthusiastically 
plundering northern New Jersey is his need to respond to miscellaneous rebellions and traitors 
within his midst.  With respect to Enron, individuals who should not have been entirely 
devoted to upper level executives—accountants, lawyers, directors of the board, mid-level 
executives, and financial analysts—failed to exercise sufficient objectivity and independence.  
The Congressional solution, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, was to erect interpersonal walls 
that did not exist, or to cement those walls that had allegedly crumbled in many public 
corporations. 
 A review of a few provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley will here suffice.  First and perhaps 
most importantly, in response to the perception that Arthur Anderson, Enron’s accountants, 
had become too cozy with top management,22 Sarbanes-Oxley included several measures to 
instill a sense of detachment in accountants.23  Second, there was a perception that Enron’s 
lawyers at Vinson and Elkins had collaborated in dubious and possibly illegal accounting 
structures.  Sarbanes-Oxley called lawyers to remember their independent duties as officers of 
the court, strengthening already existing legal ethics rules that mandate disclosure of client 
                                                 
22 See Thaddeus Herrick & Alexei Barrionuevo, Were Auditor and Client Too Close-Knit?, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 21, 2002, at C1. Seven former Andersen accountants became Enron employees in 2000 alone. 
John Schwartz & Reed Abelson, Enron's Collapse: The Partner; Auditor Struck Many as Smart and 
Upright, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at C11.  
23 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 201 (prohibiting auditors from doing non-audit work for clients); § 202 
(requiring rotation of audit partners every five years). 
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wrongdoing.24  Third, dissatisfaction with Enron’s directors, who had cavalierly approved 
Andrew Fastow myriad self-dealing arrangements, prompted measures to preserve director 
independence.25  Fourth, mid-level executives, who had been disappointingly silent as higher-
ups looted the company, were given incentives to rat  out bosses who broke the law.26  And 
finally, the financial analysts, whose independent analytical skills had been compromised by 
their firm’s investment banking activities,27 were subjected to rules insulating them from 
pressure from their own firm’s investment arms.28
     Walls, it turns out, have their uses.  As someone whose house and property is 
demarcated by solid fences, I can testify that my neighbors are delightful people, and part of 
what makes them so likeable is that they don’t trespass.  Walls remind people to keep their 
distance and mind their own business; and let’s face it, there’s much to be said for that.  In the 
private sector, accountants are in the business of certifying the accuracy of a company’s 
financial statement, and those certifications are meaningful to third parties only if the 
accountants themselves have a reputation for independence and integrity.  In theory, then, 
accountants should value their own reputations more than the fees they garner from any 
individual client; and therefore they should have sufficient incentives to “fire” any client 
engaged in deceptive or fraudulent practices.29  The theory failed to mirror practice in recent 
                                                 
24 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 602 (providing for censure and bar from practice before SEC on the basis of 
improper professional conduct); see also id. § 307.  
25 Sarbanes-Oxley § 301 (directing securities and exchange associations to prohibit listing of security 
if the issuer does not have independent audit committee). 
26 Sarbanes-Oxley § 806. 
27 See Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the Problem of Insider Trading, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
AND FIN. L. 475, 489 (2004)  (“The reason for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was a concern that 
investment banks weren't maintaining Chinese Walls between retail brokerage and underwriting.”).
28 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 501. 
29 See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) ("An 
accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for careful 
work. Fees for two years' audits could not approach the losses [the auditor] would suffer from a 
perception that it would muffle a client's fraud....").
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years, as accountants began to treat fees from accounting services as loss leaders for more 
lucrative fees for non-accounting services.  In addition, accounting firms became less vigilant 
in ensuring that their own lead accountant (in the case of Arthur Andersen’s Enron account, 
David Duncan) did not become “captured” by the client.  The result, in the case of Enron and 
Arthur Andersen, was a wholesale mingling of auditor and client.30  The regulatory solution 
was to re-erect those walls, as well as walls between lawyers and clients.  Even within firms, 
Congress became concerned that the Enron experience demonstrated the dangers of “group 
think.”  The ability of top executives to stifle internal concerns, most famously evidenced by 
the reaction to the Sherron Watkins memo in mid-2001, led Congress to strengthen 
whistleblower provisions, in effect mitigate the trust and harmony within firms, which in 
effect mitigates the trust and harmony within firms. 
The question arises, if walls are so useful for organizations in the private sector, why 
not also within government bureaucracies? 
III. The Private Sector Needs Walls, The Public Sector Needs to Share  
As a first take, it might seem that Congress got it right.  In the private sector, the 
principal danger is that individuals became so focused on private gain that they pursue it at 
the expense of society.  The modern market depends on the independence of auditors, 
lawyers, boards of directors, and financial analysts.  We assume that all these individuals are 
                                                 
30  See Marianne M. Jennings, Restoring Ethical Gumption in the Corporation: A Federalist Paper on 
Corporate Governance - Restoration of Active Virtue in the Corporate Structure to Curb the "YeeHaw 
Culture" in Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 387, 406-407 (2003)(“The staffs of Enron and Andersen 
were inextricably intertwined. As noted earlier, David Duncan was a close friend with Mr. Causey, the 
company's Chief Accounting Officer and the man responsible for approving the SPE transactions that 
Mr. Fastow handled as both CFO and principal in the off-the-books entities. Further, the employees at 
Enron were not sure who the Andersen employees were and who worked for Enron; because many 
Andersen staff had permanent offices at Enron, were often then hired by Enron, and also were 
beneficiaries of office parties, just as Enron employees were.”).
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selfish, but in erecting walls between them we ensure that their clashing self interests work to 
the benefit of society—in effect, Federalist No. 51 applied to the private sector.  
 The dangers in government are different.  There, our paramount concern is that 
individuals will forget their objective, which is to serve the common good, and instead 
become dedicated to the service of the government division in which they service.  As many 
have noted, government bureaucracies are inevitably dedicated to their own aggrandizement 
(both jurisdictional and financial).31  The long-standing conflict between the CIA and FBI 
would seem to illustrate this problem.  President Truman created the CIA in 1947 over J. 
Edgar Hoover’s objections,32 and Hoover’s “attitude influenced a generation of FBI 
agents.”33  Conflicting jurisdiction over counterintelligence operations exacerbated tensions 
between the two agencies, especially after the CIA’s original director, a relative nonentity, 
gave way to more vigorous directors.  Over the years, presidents issued a series of executive 
orders directing the CIA and FBI to coordinate operations,34 but persisting strains, evidenced 
during the investigation of Aldrich Ames,35 prompted Congress to pass the Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 1995,36 which issued yet more injunctions to the CIA and FBI to share 
and be nice.  Mixed messages, however, emanated from the executive branch, which seemed 
to suggest the desirability of walls between law enforcement and intelligence operations to 
                                                 
31 See, e.g, GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 34-36 (1965); WILLIAM NISKANEN, 
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 42 (1971).
32 See generally MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO 9/11: HOW THE SECRET WAR 
BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA HAS ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY (Simon & Schuster 2002). See 
generally Wedge 
33 David M. Crane, Divided We Stand: Counterintelligence Coordination within the Intelligence 
Community of the United States, 1995-DEC ARMY LAW 26, 33. 
34 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 C.F.R. 59941 (1981); Presidential Decision Directive 24, U.S. 
Counterintelligence Effectiveness, Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. (May 3, 1994).
35 Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and 
its Implications for United States Intelligence, 104th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1994).
36 P.L. 103-359
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guard against civil liberties violations.37  The investigation of Wen Ho was severely hampered 
by these 1995 rules,38 and a GAO report issued in July 2001 that FBI and CIA operatives 
were under the impression that their various investigations needed to be insulated in airtight 
walls.39   
The Patriot Act, belatedly but meaningfully, addressed the problem, by allowing law 
enforcement officers and intelligence agents to share information.  There is a tendency of late, 
to criticize the FBI’s and CIA’s pre-9/11 information compartmentalization as not legally 
required.  Richard Posner, for example, writes, “[B]efore 9/11 the CIA and the FBI 
exaggerated the degree to which they were forbidden to share information, and the FBI 
exaggerated the degree to which its intelligence officers and its criminal investigators were 
forbidden to share information with one another.”40  I believe this conclusion is incorrect.  
First of all, the claim that the CIA and FBI “exaggerated” the walls between them may be true 
in some respects, but there were often quite irrational legal prohibitions on the pooling of 
information.  For example, if federal prosecutors and FBI agents uncovered evidence about 
foreign intelligence operations in the course of a grand jury investigation, there was, 
consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 6(e), no mechanism by which this information could 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to the Assistant Attorney General, 
Criminal Division, the Director of the FBI, the Counsel for Intelligence Policy, and the United States 
Attorneys (July 19, 1995) (regarding "Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal 
Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations"), available 
at http:// www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html.
38 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REVIEW TEAM ON THE HANDLING OF 
THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY INVESTIGATION at 721-34 (2000).
39 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-780, FBI INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: 
COORDINATION WITHIN JUSTICE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS IS 
LIMITED (2001).
40 See RICHARD POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS (2005).  Posner adopts the conclusions of 
the 9/11 Commission.  See 9/11 Commission Report at 78-80.  I return to this issue at text 
accompanying notes xyz-xyz. 
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be shared with the CIA.  Only with the Patriot Act’s amendment to Rule 6(e) can such 
information be shared. 
Posner’s second complaint—that the FBI “exaggerated” the legal separation between 
law enforcement and intelligence operation—is even more unjust.  A string of memoranda by 
the Department of Justice emphasized that the FBI should not mingle foreign intelligence 
operations, conducted under the rubric of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
and ordinary law enforcement operations.  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC), overseen by Judge Royce Lamberth ordered the FBI to segment foreign 
intelligence/law enforcement investigations into two camps, and to document that 
information, to the extent that it flowed at all, was precisely calibrated.41  When Lamberth 
discovered that in some cases more information had been pooled than what he had prescribed, 
he reprimanded an FBI agent by name and disqualified him from serving again before the 
FISC, thus ending that agent’s career.  As Heather MacDonald has written, the reaction to 
Lamberth’s decision for FBI culture was sudden and devastating: 
[T]he FBI and Justice Department hunkered down completely. FBI headquarters and 
the [Office of Intelligence Policy and Review at the Department of Justice], already a 
crippling drag on terrorist investigations, became paralyzing weights. Recalls [former 
U.S. Attorney in Manhattan] Mary Jo White: 'The walls went higher. Nothing could 
have been worse.' It was as if the Wall had become covered with concertina wire and 
broken glass, says [former FBI agent James] Kallstrom. Morale plummeted. Agents in 
the New York bureau put signs on their desks saying: 'You may not talk to me."42
 
It is true that years later the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review got around to 
correcting Lamberth’s interpretation of the FISA,43 but it is obviously unfair to blame FBI 
                                                 
41 See In re all Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 216 F.Supp.2d 611, 620-
21 (2002) (discussing walls used in investigations in recent years).  
42 Heather MacDonald, Why the FBI Didn't Stop 9/11, CITY JOURNAL, 2002.
43 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (2002). 
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agents for trying to comply with the law, at least as the Department of Justice and federal 
judges were relentlessly interpreting it. 
 In its recommendations for governmental reorganizations, the 9/11 Commission 
emphasized the need for unity—again and again.  Its four overarching recommendations were 
to promote: “unity of effort across the foreign-domestic divide” (p. 400), “unity of effort in 
the intelligence community,” (407), “unity of effort in sharing information” (416), and “unity 
of effort in the Congress” (419).  In its subsidiary recommendations, the Commission extolled 
“the virtue of joint planning and the advantage of having someone in charge to ensure a 
unified effort” (401) and “a civilian-led unified joint command for counterterrorism” (403); 
and it recommended the creation of “a center for joint operational and joint intelligence” (403, 
emphasis in original), the creation of a new agency, the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC), that would “lead strategic analysis, pooling all-source intelligence, foreign and 
domestic” (404) and the creation of a new post, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
and who will “oversee national intelligence” and “manage the national intelligence program” 
(411). 
The political elites, including President Bush and his then-campaign opponent, John F. 
Kerry, as well as the vast majority of the members of Congress, responded almost 
immediately to the 9/11 Commission Report with fulsome praise; and most, although not 
quite all, of its recommendations found their way into law a few months after its release. The 
centerpiece of the Intelligence Reform Act, as already indicated, is the creation of a DNI who 
will streamline personnel, budgetary and policy decisions among the intelligence community 
as a whole.  Following the 9/11 Commission Report, the Act also created a new agency, the 
National Counterterrorism Center, with access to information drawn from all agencies and 
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which will conduct “strategic operational planning.”  In an executive order on June 30, 2005, 
President Bush further strengthened the DNI by giving him authority over a newly created 
department within the FBI, the National Security Service, which will coordinate intelligence 
and counterintelligence operations within the FBI.44  This recent executive order has been 
perceived as a demotion of the FBI, just as the Intelligence Reform Act was a downgrading of 
the CIA.  The message could not be clearer to the various agencies: Cultures of bureaucratic 
parochialism will no longer be permitted.   
IV. Second Thoughts  
 But does any of this make sense?  With respect to Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress seems to 
have neglected the potential difficulties that result from creating barriers both within and 
among private firms.  For example, Sarbanes-Oxley presumes that by severing business ties, 
such as consulting arrangements, with clients, auditors will face fewer incentives to commit 
fraud.  The problem, as Larry Ribstein has pointed out, is that “prohibiting some links 
between monitors and firms, such as the performance of nonaudit services, may block 
‘knowledge spillovers’ that give monitors access to valuable information.”45  Likewise, it is 
unclear that outside directors, whom Sarbanes-Oxley foists willy-nilly on all public 
corporations, will be able to detect fraud as easily as inside directors closely aligned with 
corporate management.46 Furthermore, erecting walls between accountants and lawyers and 
outside directors on the one hand and corporate insiders on the all may undermine the useful 
harmony that existed and still exist in many firms that, unlike Enron, have long thrived.  As 
                                                 
44Douglas Jehl, Bush To Create New Unit In FBI for Intelligence, NEW YORK TIMES, June 30, 2005, at 
A1.  
45 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 40, 41 (2002). 
46 Id. at 41 (“[D]irectors with inside knowledge of the company may be better able than outside 
directors to see through ambiguous, opaque, or misleading financial statements because they have 
enough background to understand the kinds of tricks insiders might be playing.”).
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Ribstein writes, “forcing insiders to deal with adversarial outsiders might induce them to see 
their jobs as a kind of game, or Dilbert comic strip, in which they must outwit clueless 
outsider directors, courts, and overly scrupulous auditors.”47  There is an abundance of 
behavioral science evidence that people behave in a less trustworthy fashion when they are 
assumed to be untrustworthy.48  It surely would have been useful for Enron to have more 
effective barriers between outsiders and insiders, but imposing such walls on other 
organizations might have substantial costs.  
 By contrast, removing such walls in the intelligence community poses many potential 
difficulties.  First, walls play a vital role in intelligence work in minimizing the dangers 
associated with double agents.  Two of the most illustrious individuals in the American 
intelligence community—former DCI James Woolsey and legendary counterintelligence chief 
Paul A. Redmond—have tried to cool the ardor among Beltway elites for “information 
sharing” within the intelligence community.  At a conference in March 2005, Woolsey 
remarked, "I really have been disturbed at the broad use of the term 'information sharing.’ . . . 
It's good not to be too enthusiastic about how well it could go if everybody in large 
bureaucracies knew everything. One of them's going to be a Wahhabi or a Chinese."49  Given 
the fact that American intelligence agencies undertook to quickly hire large numbers of 
Arabic and other foreign-language speakers after 9/11, Redmond argued that “It's an absolute 
certainty that there are spies now in the national intelligence establishment."50  (When the 
CIA tried to estimate the damage caused by Robert Hansen, it discovered that lax 
compartmentalization rules allowed this obscure analyst to review a staggering array of 
                                                 
47Id. at 42.  





documents.)  To be clear, this is not an argument against information sharing in all instances; 
it simply means that such sharing may impose certain costs.       
Another potential problem arising from the removal of departmental walls within the 
intelligence community is the greater danger to civil liberties.  In the 1970s, Congress held 
numerous hearings into the FBI’s and CIA’s allegedly abusive domestic surveillance 
activities.  The legislative remedy, the FISA, was intended to curtail the powers of foreign 
intelligence officers to operate on American soil and to create walls between intelligence 
operations on the one hand and law enforcement operations on the other.51  Those walls may 
have proven too high and air-tight in recent years; it often would have made sense to allow 
spies and cops to pool their resources rather than force them to segregate overlapping 
investigations.52  My point, again, is simply that removing walls within the intelligence 
community at least introduces a potential cost (to civil liberties), and therefore raises some 
question as to whether the wholesale removal of walls is an unmitigated good.  
  The more one reflects on the question of walls in the intelligence community, the more 
one is struck by the complexity of the problem.  Although removing walls might improve 
efficiency, even that point is not entirely clear.  One unified intelligence agency may have 
certain logistical advantages, but so too does the alternative organizational model, with 
specialized, competing and even duplicative agencies.  Yes, such agencies may end up doing 
the same thing, but this is precisely the way other fail-safe institutions, like nuclear power 
plants and air traffic control systems, operate.  As John von Neumann observed, redundancy 
makes “reliable systems out of unreliable parts.”53  Even when different organizations 
                                                 
51 I discuss this in Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress 
(Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 ILL. L. REV. 599, 614-15.   
52 See supra note 39.  
53 Quoted in http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4035/is_n2_v42/ai_20034968 
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perform similar tasks, they may bring complementary skills to bear.  The 9/11 Commission 
Report observed that although the CIA and the Defense Department both engage in 
paramilitary operations, each has “comparative advantages”: The CIA is noted for its “agility 
in operations,” while the Defense Department is renowned for being “methodical and 
cumbersome.”54  There would seem to be obvious arguments for leaving well enough along, 
but the Report proceeds, bafflingly, that “[t]he CIA’s experts should be integrated into the 
military’s training, exercises, and planning.”55  Why?  So that CIA operations could be as 
“cumbersome” as military operations?56   
 And how will all this “information sharing” play out in practice?  One need not 
subscribe to the egotistical philosophy of Ayn Rand to believe that most hard work is done 
either alone or in small groups.  I can attest from experience that the most dreaded words one 
can hear as a young associate tasked with writing a legal brief is that yet another partner 
wanted to be “kept in the loop.”  What that means is:  longer meetings, more conference calls, 
more “suggestions,” another ego to stroke, and essentially zero added value.  Although I have 
no experience in intelligence work, reading through the Intelligence Reform Act left me 
almost sorrowful as I imagined the well-meaning and beleaguered CIA analyst in Langley 
who is now spending half his week scurrying to meetings at Quantico and Foggy Bottom and 
Fort Meade.  Maybe he’ll pick up some useful information during all those meetings, but will 
it compensate for all the lost time, all the additional rigmarole?  Moreover, in the private 
                                                 
54 9/11 Commission Report at 416. 
55 Id. 
56 What makes this proposal, which fortunately was not adopted in the Intelligence Reform Act, all the 
more mysterious is the fact that, by all accounts, the CIA paramilitary teams performed extraordinarily 
well in Afghanistan.  In general, the decision to demote the CIA in the newly fangled intelligence 
community given that, of al the agencies, the CIA comes off relatively well in the 9/11 Commission 
Report.  See id. at 349 (“Before 9/11, no agency had more responsibility—or did more—to attack Al 
Qaeda, working day and night, than the CIA.”).  
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sector we realize that individuals perform better at specialized tasks, and every expansion of a 
job’s scope comes at a potential cost in terms of worker efficiency.  A Defense Department 
analyst studying Russian submarines may, in the course of his work, come across an item of 
broader interest.  But to the extent that we remorselessly badger the poor fellow with the shrill 
commands “Share! Cooperate!” we will presumably be distracting him from locating Russian 
subs.  
 All this wall destruction is justified by the need to remake the intelligence 
community’s “culture”; there is, however, some doubt as to whether that culture will improve 
when we replace competing agencies, each with their own esprit de corps, with one big blob 
of an agency.  It is not easy to say what motivates particularly talented individuals to join and 
remain in the CIA or NSA or FBI, but it cannot be money, for these individuals could earn 
more in the private sector.  It is likely that many persons find the study of foreign affairs and 
national security more interesting than modeling yen-deutschemark spreads or advising 
chemical companies to minimize exposure to asbestos litigation.  But think tanks and “private 
CIA” companies, such as Stratfor and Open Source, LLC, provide private sector opportunities 
in these fields.  Public-spiritedness—a desire to serve the country—doubtless captures part of 
what inspires individuals to join and remain in governmental organizations, but closely 
connected is a sense is that one is part of an elite, and not some run-of-of-the mill, 
governmental organization.57  This factor would seem to have especial relevance when we 
consider the CIA, an organization despised in our democratic society and many of whose top 
                                                 
57 Someone told me a story about trying to secure a job at the Department of Justice for a friend, who 
had done work on a political campaign.  The supervisor looked at the resume of the applicant and said, 
haughtily, “Send him over to [the Department of] Commerce.  We don’t hire people like this at 
Justice.”   Anyone who has lived in Washington, D.C. for some time is aware of the occasional 
smugness of those working at “Mother Justice.”  And even within the Justice Department, certain 
departments, such as the Office of Legal Counsel and the Solicitor General’s Office, pride themselves 
as the elite within the elite.      
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employees must wonder why they are undertaking sacrifices for a country, typified by a ever-
wary and often insulting Congress, that so thoroughly distrusts them.  The wholesale 
resignations at the CIA whenever a DCI departs suggests that the CIA employee’s ego is 
relatively “fragile” and that he or she needs to feel “appreciated.”58  As the CIA’s prominence 
in the newly fashioned “no walls” intelligence community declines, one wonders if the CIA 
will continue to attract and retain its top employees, or whether they will flee for the private 
sectors, leaving the bureaucratic deadbeats behind.59  So much for fostering a culture of 
creativity and imagination.        
 Indeed, perhaps the most striking “intelligence failure” of the 9/11 Commission, and 
the Congress that adopted most of its recommendations—and here I use intelligence in the 
everyday sense of dumb vs. smart—is the assumption that the twin goals of organizational 
coordination and organizational creativity are compatible.  As I earlier suggested, from the 
point of view of the young legal associate, a partner’s request to remain in the loop induces 
terror for it necessarily multiplies one’s work.  Nor am I convinced that, from the point of 
view of the client, it is advantageous to have yet another draftsman at the table.  Leaving aside 
the added cost, the more partners on a brief, the more difficult it is to stake out a truly creative 
position.  What one partner considers inventive, the other four will likely regard as outlandish, 
and thus does it end up on the cutting room floor.  The best legal briefs that I have ever read 
are the work of one or two people, who disappeared into an office for a few weeks and 
                                                 
58 POSNER, supra note 40, at 45-46. 
59 Of course, other organizations, such as the NCTC, may emerge as the new “elites,” but that will take 
some time (5 years, 10 years?) over the course of which we must assume that the talent pool in the 
intelligence community will be lower than what it is now.  In addition, once a new elite develops, it 
will fashion, formally or informally, walls that segregate itself from other organizations that it deems 
inferior.  Many in the CIA reportedly think that the acronym DIA, which most of us assume stands for 
Defense Intelligence Agency, in fact represents Da Idiot Agency.  The DIA returns the favor by 
referring to the CIA as “Clowns in Action.”   
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emerged with a final product, to be massaged but not dramatically altered by others.  And not 
surprisingly, when we consider truly creative endeavors, it is almost impossible to name a 
great novel or poem or play or sculpture or painting that was “co-produced.”  Turning to the 
intelligence community, the greater the emphasis on sharing and coordination and team-work, 
the harder it will likely be for one or two courageous analysts to stake out a controversial 
position and argue it forcefully.60   
V. Can the Private Sector Teach Government Anything?  
 In 2000, Fortune magazine ranked all American corporations on a number of matrices, 
and one stood out for praise.  It showed extraordinarily high profits year after year, and the 
magazine crowned it No. 1 for innovativeness and No. 2 in attracting and retaining talent.  
That company ceased to exist a year and half later—its name was Enron. 
 It is comical, albeit darkly so, to read articles about the “Enron culture” pre- and post-
crash.  In its heady days, Enron was celebrated for its free-wheeling and innovative culture.61  
A few years later, the same “rank and yank” culture was said to be central to Enron’s 
failure.62  It is fairly easy to understand why a “rank and yank” culture might excite disdain in 
the academic community, whose denizens either hunger for, or wallow in, the ultimate in job 
security—tenure.  That being said, it is hard to argue with success, and the world’s most 
successful company, at least rated by market capitalization, is General Electric, and its long-
time CEO Jack Welch famously employed a “fire the bottom 10%” approach similar to that 
used at Enron.  Still, one cannot say that any particular business culture is good or bad, at least 
if the criterion is making money.  Some organizations thrive with brutal competition, others 
                                                 
60 See Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, Intelligence Failure and Reform: Evaluating the 9/11 
Commission Report, BREAKTHROUGHS, Vol. 14, No. 1, at 12.   
61 John Greenwald, Rank and Fire, TIME, June 11, 2001. 
62 What Really Went Wrong at Enron?  A Culture of Evil, Match 5, 2002, symposium discussion 
available at http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ethicalperspectives/enronpanel.html 
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by emphasizing job security.  Consider the two law firms of Kirkland & Ellis and Cleary, 
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton.  Kirkland is legendary as an “eat what you kill” firm, with 
partner’s draws annually re-calculated on the basis of “what have you done for me lately,” 
that is, how much work have you brought in; Cleary assures partners of lockstep annual 
increases, regardless of work generated.  Both policies seem to have worked quite 
respectably, with annual partner draws of about $1.5 million per year.63  The success of these 
two firms suggests that “one culture” need not fit all—that different people might thrive in 
different environments:  A Kirkland lawyer might find the Cleary culture too collegial; a 
Cleary lawyer might find the Kirkland culture too competitive.         
 Enron’s culture was—after the fact—diagnosed as a weird brew of competitiveness 
and coziness.  Enron’s executives were too chummy, it was said, with its directors, 
accountants, lawyers, and financial analysts.  Yet as mentioned earlier, this sort of 
chumminess might prove useful in a well-run company.  Businessmen and lawyers, for 
example, can prove quite symbiotic.  The former are trained to generate multiple ideas, and 
the sort of person who excels in a business setting is prone to optimism;64 the latter are trained 
to watch their words carefully (consider the effect of the “Socratic method”), and they are 
always thinking of worst case scenarios.  A thriving company might prefer not to have walls 
between these two groups, but to promote a high level of trust and interaction.  To the extent 
that Sarbanes-Oxley imposes nebulous duties on lawyers to rat out their clients, that level of 
trust will diminish.  Regulatory solutions of this nature reflect a fixation on what went wrong 
at companies like Enron, and impose those “solutions” on companies that may have had no 
problems to begin with, or were even thriving as they were currently constituted.  Indeed, it is 
                                                 
63 Top 200 Law Firms, American Law, at 
http://www.law.com/special/professionals/amlaw/amlaw200/amlaw200_ppp.html.   
64 See generally MARTIN SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTIMISM (1991). 
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odd to make Enron the poster child for pervasive corporate corruption and the model for 
regulatory solutions when, as Professor John Coffee has noted, its “governance structure was 
sui generis.”65         
 None of this is to say that the private sector is often not flawed.  In any large company, 
executives have incentives to pursue personal aggrandizement over the company’s gain.  Part 
of what makes one company successful, and another not, is cost-effectively monitoring 
agents, but even in the best company one must assume some residual loss.  Although agency 
costs have long been the subject of academic study,66 there has lately been a growing interest 
in the way “bounded rationality” plays out in the corporate setting. It turns out that cognitive 
biases are rife in boardrooms and offices just as they are in every other setting that human 
being inhabit.  Indeed, in certain respects biases are most likely to flourish in business 
settings: 
High levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy are associated with aggressiveness, 
perseverance, and optimal risk-taking. These biases may be particularly adaptive in 
business settings, where decisiveness and aggressiveness are considered indicators of a 
successful manager. Certainly, overconfidence at times leads to disaster and severe 
career failure. Those who fail too visibly are often weeded out. However, there is little 
evidence that successful managers learn humility very well. Instead, they 
recharacterize their minor failures in self-serving terms. They take the apparent 
absence of major failures, maybe from luck as much as anything else, as proof of 
superior skill. High levels of optimism and confidence are not only good internal 
motivators, but they also influence others; exhibitions of confidence and optimism 
make people more persuasive and influential.67
                                                 
65 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 BUS. LAW. 
1403, 1403-04 (2002)  (“Enron's governance structure was sui generis. Other public corporations 
simply have not authorized their chief financial officer to run an independent entity that enters into 
billions of dollars of risky and volatile trading transactions with them; nor have they allowed their 
senior officers to profit from such self-dealing transactions without broad supervision or even 
comprehension of the profits involved. Nor have other corporations incorporated thousands of 
subsidiaries and employed them in a complex web of off-balance sheet partnerships.”).
66 See, e.g, Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
67 Donald C. Langevoot, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead 
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 153-54 (1997). 
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There is a staggeringly large literature, ignored in its entirety by the 9/11 Commission, 
devoted to understanding how corporations can minimize the effect of optimism and 
commitment biases in its managers.  Likewise, there is a staggeringly large literature, ignored 
by the 9/11 Commission, as to how corporations improve “upward information flow” to 
ensure that subordinates generate the best possible data and do not simply mimic their 
managers’ views. 
Companies in the private sector operate in a highly competitive environment, and 
market forces reward those companies that best counter the effect of cognitive biases.  But 
there does not appear to be any single “solution.”  In banks, for example, it has been found 
useful to separate lending groups (perhaps prone to optimism bias) from workout groups 
(perhaps overly prone to discount the possibility of creative thinking).68  At Intel, by contrast, 
long-time CEO Andy Grove encouraged a free-wheeling flow of ideas, his motto being, “Let 
chaos reign, then reign in the chaos.”  Grove argued this culture allowed him to recognize and 
predict “strategic inflection points,” that is, business upheavals triggered by changes in 
technology or regulation or competition.  For Intel, the critical moment was in the 1980s, 
when it abandoned the dynamic random access memory market, in which it had thrived, to 
pursue the microprocessor market, which meant the firing of thousands of employees and a 
calamitous half billion dollar write-off when a technical glitch was encountered.69  Grove’s 
decision was quickly validated, and is now consistently lauded in business school classes as a 
model of strategic leadership.  Interestingly, even at Intel there was not quite as much honest 
“upward information flow” as Grove had assumed, which may explain why Intel persisted in 
                                                 
68 The definitive work on this cultural divide within banks is TOM WOLFE, MAN IN FULL (2000). 
69 See generally Robert Burgelman, Fading Memories: A Process Theory of Strategic Business Exit in 
Dynamic Environments, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 24 (1994). 
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the memory market after it became clear (at least retrospectively) that a move to 
microprocessors was unavoidable.70
What does all this suggest about reforming “the intelligence community?”  One 
conclusion might be that the goal of forging a singular culture is misguided.  The various 
segments of the community are engaged in quite different tasks and might attract different 
kinds of people.  The sort of person who could thrive as an NSA analyst might be less well 
suited to work in the CIA.  The 9/11 Commission, and the Congress that adopted most of its 
recommendations, ignored the substantial benefits in allowing different organizations to 
develop idiosyncratic cultures through specialization on discrete tasks.  For example, the 
Commission apparently criticizes the NSA for not following up on information gleaned in late 
1999 about communications between men named Khalid, Nawaf, and Salem.  “Working-level 
officials in the intelligence community knew little more than this. . . . The NSA did not think 
that its job was to research these identities. It saw itself as an agency to support intelligence 
consumers such as the CIA.  The NSA tried to respond energetically to any request made.  
But it waited to be asked.”71  The reason that the NSA had this view of its own 
responsibilities, apparently unbeknownst to the 9/11 Commission, is that Executive Order 
12333 specifically defines the NSA’s roles as the collection, processing and dissemination of 
information in accordance with the DCI.  And this makes a lot of sense:  “Otherwise, the 
                                                 
70 Chris Argyris, Double Loop Learning and Implementable Validity, at 
http://www.palgrave.com/pdfs/1403911401.pdf (“When middle manager wanted to move from 
memory products to . . . microprocessors. . . they strove to communicate their views to top executives, 
but failed to get their message across. . .  .Later, when [a researcher] told Andy Grove this story, he did 
not believe it.  To his credit, he interviewed the relevant managers and learned that it was true.”). 
71 9/11 Commission Report at 353. 
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potentially infinite realm of signals to intercept or images to acquire would rapidly overwhelm 
the NSA or any of the other technical agencies.”72        
The 9/11 Commission urged Congress to institutionalize a culture of creativity in the 
intelligence community, and Congress codified the recommendation, incoherently and one 
must assume ineffectually, by authorizing the DNI to create myriad “red teams” to play 
devil’s advocate.73  But it is not at all clear that, for much of the intelligence community, 
creativity is a job requirement: NSA analysts should be meticulous, not creative.  
Furthermore, creativity is often problematic, especially in the public sector.  Someone who 
comes up with an innovative idea or prepares to chart a revolutionary path in the private 
sector, as Grove did when he entered the microprocessor market, is quickly held in check by 
profits and losses.  A creative idea that loses a company millions of dollars year after year 
(and most of them do) will soon be abandoned, or the company bankrupted; but this is not the 
case in the public sector.  Indeed, in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Department of Defense was freed from the “tyranny of scenario plausibility” and promptly 
embarked on a spending spree that has saddled the country to this day with countless wasteful 
projects.74  It’s swell to “let chaos rein” in the private sector, but it does not seem like a good 
idea in the public sector. 
 To the extent that one really wanted to generate a culture of creativity, a multi-billion 
dollar reshuffling and enlargement of existing and newly created bureaucracies is not the most 
cost-effective solution that comes to mind.  When Ronald Reagan was elected president in 
1980, the CIA was a wasteland of bureaucratic inertia and incompetence, strangled by its own 
                                                 
72 Rovner and Long, supra note 60, at 11. 
73 Intelligence Reform Act, § 1017(a). 
74 See Carl Connetta and Charles Knight, Dealing with Uncertainty: The New Logic of American 
Military Planning, PROJECT ON DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES, February 1998. 
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legalistic DCI, Stansfield Turner, and by a Congress that had held endless hearings on CIA 
abuses.  Reagan’s solution was simple:  He brought back former OSS agent William J. Casey 
to be DCI, and told him to go to work.  Casey immediately plucked a few analysts from 
within the CIA, as well as scouring the private sector for talent, and let them loose.  “Virtually 
overnight the CIA was back in business, and hardly a week went by without Casey being 
hauled before one Congressional committee or another because its members were ‘outraged’ 
or ‘horrified’ by some leaked CIA analysis that challenged the conventional wisdom, or by 
some overseas operation that had gone wrong and had kicked up a diplomatic storm.”75  
Likewise, to foster a culture of creativity in the CIA, President George W. Bush might have 
named a swashbuckling DCI, given him the authority to hire as he saw fit (which would 
include people now disqualified because of familial connections in the Arab world or because 
of drug use in college) and than, as Bette Davis would say, “Buckle up, everybody, it’s going 
to be a bumpy ride.”76
But this was not the approach taken by the 9/11 Commission or the Congress that 
enacted the Intelligence Reform Act.  It bears pointing out in this context that the 9/11 
Commission was lawyer-heavy—in addition to a General Counsel, there were 24 other 
lawyers listed on the staff77--with very few, if any, heavyweights from the intelligence 
community.  Even more debilitating, it was a politicized Commission, with all of its members 
big-shots in either the Democratic or Republican parties.  This fact, plus the Commission’s 
determination to issue a unanimous report, resulted in a slew of self-serving and meaningless 
lines like “We believe that both President Clinton and President Bush were genuinely 
                                                 
75 Herbert E. Meyer, A Talent for Intelligence, REAL CLEAR POLITICS.COM, at 
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=4523 
76 All About Eve (1950). 
77 9/11 Commission Report at xiii-xiv. 
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concerned about the danger posed by Al Qaeda.”78  Ever careful never to say anything too 
critical about either President, or any politically prominent individual by name, the 
Commission instead scolded faceless organizations such as “the FBI.” 
As mentioned earlier, the Commission peddled the now-popular theory that the FBI 
“exaggerated” legal barriers.  In making this assertion, the Commission never even 
acknowledged that Judge Royce Lamberth minted an erroneous interpretation of the FISA 
that had handcuffed the FBI for years, until the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
Review reversed him.  Nor did the Commission explore the role that Lamberth’s erroneous 
interpretation played in shaping an FBI culture that was wary of information sharing.79  
Likewise, the Commission circumspectly side-stepped the role of Attorney General Janet 
Reno and Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, in issuing memoranda that ordered the 
FBI to observe internal barriers even “beyond what was legally required.”80  But this latter 
omission is not particularly surprising given Gorelick’s astonishing presence on the 
Commission itself.81
                                                 
78 9/11 Commission Report at 349. 
79 See supra at text accompanying note xyz. 
80 Gorelick’s memo, after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, stated, “We believe that it is prudent 
to establish a set of instructions that will more clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation 
from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond 
what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that [the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act] is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a 
criminal investigation."  The declassified memo is now available at   
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/1995_wall.pdf.   
81 In a telling passage, the 9/11 Commission Report quotes one FBI agent criticizing an informational 
“wall” and even noting that “someday someone will die” as a result of the legal barriers.  9/11 
Commission Report at 271.   The Commission Report then goes out of its way to exonerate Member 
Gorelick of any wrongdoing, noting that technically her 1995 memorandum would not have foreclosed 
the communication in question.  Id at 539 n. 83.  The Report nonetheless does not endorse the 
memorandum, in fact remaining dubitante on this point: “[w]hatever the merits of the March 1995 
Gorelick memorandum. . . . ”  Id.  Truly, this is bizarre.  Either the memorandum was right, both as a 
matter of law and policy, or it was wrong.  Surely, the Commission should have taken a position on 
this vital point, but then again how could it, given that Gorelick was herself on the Commission.  
Instead of focusing on this point, the Report complains broadly about the FBI’s “bureaucratic culture” 
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Turning to the recommendations, the Commission (and later Congress’s) fixation on 
bureaucratic reshufflings apparently reflects the idea that a decision-maker acting upon 
incomplete information will make mistakes, and what is needed is to disturb existing 
informational relationships. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how internal bureaucratic 
changes will do much to remedy the problem.  Schematically, the intelligence community 




Now it looks like that: 
  
 Diagram 2 
 
There are more boxes and more dotted lines in Diagram 2, but precisely how this will 
facilitate the upward flow of accurate information remains anyone’s guess.  And if interesting 
morsels of information do rise, there is no certainty that the people at the top of the food chain 
will bother to listen.  
Let us now contrast how the private and public sectors reorganize in response to 
“strategic inflection points.”  When Andy Grove realized that Intel needed to shift to the 
microprocessors market, he embarked on a painful transition, firing thousands of workers and 
losing, in the short term, hundreds of millions of dollars.  Had Grove not made this shift, of 
course, Intel would have long since ceased to exist, or at a minimum would not be the 
                                                                                                                                                        
that led it to resist sharing of information.  Given that the Deputy Attorney General has emphasized 
that the walls between counterintelligence and criminal investigation should “go beyond what is 
legally required” precisely what sort of culture was it reasonable to expect?       
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spectacularly successful corporation we recognize today.  By contrast, the 9/11 Commission 
informs us that we face a new and mortal threat, “Islamic terrorism.”82  Yet the public sector 
solution is to add thousands of employees and create new agencies, but otherwise leave 
everyone in place.  If one truly had wanted to change the culture of the intelligence 
community, it would have made more sense simply to bring back someone in the mold of Bill 
Casey and then slashed the intelligence community’s budget in half.  Such a reduction would 
have forced some useful hard thoughts about priorities.  When it comes to public sector 
reorganizations, however, it turns out that there is no pain, only gain.   
In sum, organizations in the private sector forge idiosyncratic cultures in response to 
market conditions.  Government attempts to remake firm cultures are almost by definition 
misguided; for most firms that exist, and certainly the ones that thrive, already have 
successful cultures: If they hadn’t, they wouldn’t be here and surely wouldn’t consistently be 
turning a profit.  Government organizations, by contrast, face no economic pressures.  They 
may adapt cultures that are successful in terms of motivating employees to seek and promote 
the public good; but just as likely, government organizations adapt perverse cultures in which 
the overriding objective is ingratiating itself with the dispenser of funds (usually Congress).  
Indeed, the latter organizations likely will succeed in competition with the former, at least in 
the warped Darwinian world of government.      
VI. Conclusion  
 This article is a plea for a truce in the culture wars.83  Congress is not qualified to re-
make corporate cultures.  Inevitably, any reforms Congress decrees will be rationalized with 
reference to failed companies that had—by definition—failed cultures. The “solutions” 
                                                 
82 9/11 Commission Report at 364.   
83 For the inspiration for the title of the Article, see F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce 
in the Marriage Wars, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 561. 
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Congress orders, however, will saddle all firms, including thriving firms with successful 
cultures.  Turning to the public sector, although it is true that many government bureaucratic 
cultures may be diseased, the hard question is whether Congress is likely to improve matters, 
at least when its solution simply consists of reshuffling, expanding and adding entire 
departments.  If Congress identifies a government bureaucracy with a deficient culture, the 
best solution is either to slash the budget or eliminate the bureaucracy altogether, especially 
when it seems to serve no purpose whatsoever.   NASA immediately comes to mind in this 
context, but the astonishing persistence of this often fatal boondoggle suggests the political 
infeasibility of the elimination option in virtually in all instances.84   
How might one have designed a 9/11 Commission more likely to generate useful ideas 
for reform?  Principally, one should have reduced the number of politicians and lawyers, and 
in their place invited people who are apolitical (e.g., scientists) and able to generate truly 
creative ideas (read: fewer lawyers, more businesspeople).  For example, when in 1986 
NASA commissioned a panel to study why the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded soon after 
take-off, it included the Nobel laureate Richard Feynman. Unlike many others on the panel, 
who were long-time NASA bureaucrats, Feynman had no axe to grind, just a brilliant mind to 
deploy, and his ten-page appendix explains what precisely went wrong and begins and ends 
with the central questions:  How risky is the Space Shuttle and how much risk is tolerable?85
My criticisms of the 9/11 Commission or in the Congress that enacted the Intelligence 
Reform Act does not discount the possibility that each body included truly public-spirited 
individuals.  What this article has tried to bring out is the near-impossible task that confronted 
                                                 
84 After both the 1986 and 2003 Space Shuttle Crash, members of Congress excoriated the NASA “culture.” 
NASA also formed commissions panels to investigate, and inevitably their reports were festooned with 
disparaging references to NASA’s “culture.”  
85 Report on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Appendix F, at  
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Appendix-F.txt. 
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them.  Even if we imagine someone with the intelligence of a Richard Feynman and the 
patriotism of a Patrick Henry, what would such a person have done when faced with the 
cultural divide reflected in the following account of life pre-9/11 in the intelligence 
community:    
Very different cultures deepened the wall between intelligence and law enforcement. 
For instance, FBI agents have Top Secret clearances, but few are cleared into the 
Specialized Compartmentalized Information that is the woof and warp of intelligence. 
So when faced by unfamiliar FBI counterparts in meetings, CIA agents officer might 
be sincerely uncertain about how much they could say.  FBI agents, in turn, feared that 
inadvertent disclosures might jeopardize prosecutions.  The safest course was to say 
nothing.  If the conversation turned to matters domestic, then the CIA officials would 
also be uncertain how much they should hear.86  
 
Obviously, this state of affairs is insane.  But what is the correct reform?  Here we rub up 
against the Hayekian point that a central planner, regardless of how bright and well-meaning, 
is never able to forecast how many widgets a factory in Topeka or Kiev should manufacture 
(which is why this should be left to the market).  Nor can one individual (or even an 8-person 
commission of philosopher-kings) design a perfect intelligence community, calibrating the 
walls and barriers perfectly to account for the various logistical and civil liberties 
requirements.  This fact does not relieve us of the need to construct an intelligence 
community, but it would suggest a certain humility in approaching this undertaking.  
 So had I been asked to participate in the 9/11 Commission, my approach would have 
been as follows:  All things considered, the intelligence community did not do all that badly.  
The Commission harped on supposed shortcomings of the intelligence community, but my 
reaction when reading the Report was often quite the opposite.  The picture of the intelligence 
community that comes across on most of the pages of the Report is of truly well-meaning and 
energetic public servants, who may have misunderstood some of the legal barriers to 
                                                 
86 Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Sharing, Rand Publication.  
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information sharing, which was hardly surprising given the complexity of the law and the 
sparse and contradictory guidance supplied by their superiors.87  Because the intelligence 
community as currently constituted performed relatively well, structural tinkering is 
preferable to radical overhaul.  The Patriot Act’s amendments to FISA and grand jury secrecy 
rules make sense, for they eliminate some of the more plainly nonsensical features of pre-9/11 
law.  Beyond that, however, the radical changes dictated by the Intelligence Reform Act may 
or may not have some salutary consequences five or ten years out, but we know with certainty 
that they will cause upheaval, and a consequent reduction of efficiency, in the short term.  
Given the uncertain long-term benefits and the certain short-term costs, such massive 
reorganizations should be regarded with some caution. 
 I fear that there after some future terrorist attack, another Commission may inaugurate 
further structural upheaval.  The expected overhaul at that point will consist of stripping 
domestic intelligence work out of the purview of the FBI and creating an entirely new 
bureaucracy altogether—a counterpart to Britain’s MI-5.  There is some abstract logic to 
support such a change; and indeed, such a change makes more logical sense than most of the 
reorganizations recently undertaken.  The basic idea is that intelligence work should be done 
by spies, not cops, and therefore should be outside the FBI’s bailiwick.  That said, I am still 
                                                 
87 I have earlier written about the energetic attempts of FBI agent Colleen Rowley, whose efforts to 
search Zacarias Moussaoui’s laptop computer were derailed by FBI headquarters.  See Craig S. 
Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 957-71 (2003).  Also impressive 
were the labors of the FBI’s New York office, which tried to pursue an investigation with respect to 
two 9/11 hijackers, only to face interference due to perceived legal barriers.  See 9/11 Commission 
Report at 270-72.  Nor was the CIA nearly as ineffectual as some have claimed.  For example, “CIA 
assets in Afghanistan” correctly reported that Bin Laden was in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1999 and 
pitched the idea of killing him then and there.  High level officials who—surprise, surprise, go 
unnamed in the 9/11 Commission Report—vetoed  the idea.  See id. at 140 (“’It was a fat pitch, a 
home run.’ . . . When came back that they should stand down, ‘we all just slumped.’”).  If bureaucrats 
in the Department of Education were half as energetic and public-spirited as the members of the 
intelligence community depicted in the 9/11 Commission Report, American schoolchildren might be 
mastering classical Greek at age 12. 
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not convinced that, in actual practice, such a reorganization will prove beneficial.  True, the 
United States is unique among Western nations in having its domestic intelligence conducted 
by an arm of law enforcement.  But it is hard to know which structure is necessarily better.  In 
America, domestic intelligence is conducted by the FBI, which can threaten people with 
criminal prosecution, and this is a powerful motivator to talk.  By contrast, Britain’s MI-5 
does not have prosecutorial powers; criminal investigations of domestic enemy infiltrators 
must be passed over to Scotland Yard.88  There are costs and benefits to keeping domestic 
intelligence within the FBI, and perhaps we should just leave well enough alone. 
The 9/11 Commission and the Congress that enacted the Intelligence Reform Act 
obsessed about forging a new culture in the intelligence community, but the reality is that the 
intelligence community cannot forge a culture antithetical to the spirit of the general culture 
of society.  At least in a democracy, if society at large thinks that spies are wicked and to be 
distrusted, it is unlikely that responsive political elites will tolerate a truly invigorated 
intelligence community.  Although not at all congenial to the modern democratic spirit, it 
might be useful for some future commission to lay out some facts with clarity, such as: The 
reason the CIA and the rest of intelligence community exist in the first place is that there are 
evil people in this world who want to kill us.  Yes, he who fights monsters must be wary of 
becoming one, but an even greater danger facing many Western liberal democracies is the 
delusion that there are no monsters at all. 
                                                 
88 In the wake of the July 7, 2005 London bombings, some commentators have pointed to the 
shortcomings of the U.K. model. 
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